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Two studies of 100 children aged 3 to 12 years examined theory of mind (ToM) 
understanding via explanations and predictions in hearing preschoolers and ToM-delayed deaf 
children. Study 1’s 75 children (31 deaf; 44 hearing) displayed an “explanation advantage”, devising 
valid epistemic ToM explanations despite failing simpler forced- hoice false-belief (FB) prediction 
tests. This novel discovery for deaf children extended to unexpectedly fr quent cognitive (“think” or 
“know”) explanations. Study 2 (with 25 additional deaf children; mean age 9) showed that 
microgenetic FB explanation practice resulted in significant gains on FB prediction post-tests that 
were absent in a non-ToM control group.  Implications for (a) explanation’s interconnection with 
conceptual development, (b) designing ToM interventions, and (c) tea hing deaf and hearing 
children are discussed.  
 
 
Explaining the Unpredictable: The Development of Causal Theories of Mind in Deaf and 
Hearing Children 
Explanation is fundamental to cognition and a natural part of everyday social interaction 
(Keil, 2006).  When A asks “Why?” and B supplies an explanation, both parties are able to evaluate 
and learn about causal concepts. Why-questions are evident in children’s spontaneous speech from as 
early as age 2 years (Hickling & Wellman, 2001) and their focus, like that of children’s explanatory 
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Hickling & Wellman, 2001). Children’s own spontaneous explanations likewise draw heavily on 
themes of human behavior, emotion and belief (e.g., Dunn & Brown, 1993). Schult and Wellman 
(1997) found young preschoolers explained people’s mistaken actions (A wanted to do X but did Y) 
via psychological states over 85% of the time. Thus, children’s causal questions and explanations 
reflect their developing theories of mind. Moreover, in both spontaneous conversation and in 
controlled laboratory tests, children’s explanations are often surprisingly adept (Wellman, 2011). 
Hearing preschoolers often do better at explanation than prediction consistent with an “explanation 
advantage” hypothesis (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Rhodes & Wellman, 2013). Theory of mind 
(ToM), or the child’s understanding of the mental world (Flavell, 2004) develops rapidly during 
childhood (Harris, 2006; Hughes, 2016; Wellman, 2014). One key aspect, the recognition that human 
behavior is the product of mental states like beliefs, is prototypically assessed using inferential false-
belief tasks (Wellman, Cross & Watson, 2001).  
There can be limitations to using tasks with a specific conceptual focus (e.g. false belief)) as a 
marker for a larger multi-faceted conceptual domain (e.g., ToM), as has been noted by several critics 
(e.g., Astington, 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004).  For some purposes, however, a focus on false belief 
remains useful because such tasks (a) have been used and validated worldwide with thousands of 
children (see Wellman, et al., 2001, for a meta-analysis), (b) are consistently reliable in multiple 
variations (e.g., yielding the same results with dolls versus real people as protagonists: Wellman et 
al., 2001), and (c) have proved to reveal developmental change in both typically developing children 
(TD) and those with ToM delays owing to autism or deafness (see Happé, 1995, and Peterson, 2009, 
for reviews). Moreover, variation in false belief competence reliably predicts various social-
interactive competencies such as peer interactions, reciprocated friendship and popularity (see 
Slaughter, Imuta, Peterson & Henry, 2015 for a meta-analysis), children’s engagement in pr tending 
and deception games (LaLonde & Chandler, 1995; Peskin & Ardino, 2003) or persuasion (Bartsch & 
London, 2000; Slaughter, Peterson & Moore, 2013), as well as academic achievement and 
relationships with teachers during the transition to school (Lecce, Caputi & Hughes, 2011).  
False-belief tasks, the prime measure of children’s ToM in past research, usually require 
predictions of the actions or thoughts of naïve protagonists with beliefs that clash with reality. Most 
typically-developing (TD) children under age 5 fail by making reality-driven predictions that ignore 
the protagonist’s state of mind. Another less common false-belief task, however, involves false belief 
explanation. As in prediction tasks, a naïve protagonist lacks information known to the child. Then 
the protagonist acts misguidedly (e.g., searches for an object where she last saw it rather than where 
it is now) and the child has to explain why. Strikingly, in direct comparisons, young children who do 
not yet fully understand false beliefs often perform better on explanation than prediction versions of 
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the surface, prediction tasks might seem to be easier. Responses simply require choosing between 
two presented options (e.g., former versus current hiding places), whereas explanation t sks require 
mounting a more self-initiated and extended causal argument. Thus prediction tasks have more the 
cognitive quality of recognition where explanation tasks demand production and recognition is ofte
easier than production.  
Yet an explanation advantage has been documented and replicated in several ToM studies 
using standard false belief prediction and explanation tasks with hearing preschoolers (e.g., 
Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Bartsch, Campbell & Troseth, 2007; Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; 
Rhodes & Wellman, 2013). Importantly, these standard explanation tasks only require understanding 
of ToM-driven actions (e.g., Why did she go there for a bandaid?) in keeping with a standard false 
belief task’s focus on predicting action (“Where will she go for a bandaid?”). As such they do not 
require more sophisticated meta-cognitive understanding of the causes for cognition (e.g., “Why 
does Ann think the bandaids are there?’’ ). Wimmer & Mayringer (1998) found no explanation 
advantage using meta-cognitive tests requiring children to explain an actor’s reasons for thinking 
what she thought, as opposed to an actor’s reasons for acting as she acted. Difficulty with reasoning 
about causes for beliefs i  consistent with other research s owing that tests of higher-order meta-
cognitive “thinking-about-thinking” skills often lead to responses that are unclear and confused in 
young children, even including those who are lr ady at ceiling on both prediction and explanation 
versions of standard false belief tests that carefully ask only about overt behavior (see Flavell, 2004; 
Miller, 2009 for reviews). 
What could account for an explanation advantage on standard false belief tests? There are 
roughly two classes of proposal.  First are interactional-familiarity accounts. Because TD 
preschoolers from age 2 on frequently engage spontaneously in explanatory conversation, asking and 
answering why-questions about human behavior many times a day (Callanan & Oakes, 1992; 
Hickling & Wellman, 2001), this interest and practice might promote surprising facility on ToM 
explanation tasks. Relatedly, educators (e.g., Chi et al., 1994) have demonstrated the power of 
students’ explaining why an author or teacher has claimed something for the mathematical and 
scientific learning of children and adults, supporting a general claim that practice t explanation aids 
cognitive growth. Socio-cognitive conflict paradigms involving peers exchanging explanations for 
Piagetian conservation problems likewise show cognitive benefits from the act of explaining. 
Collaborators’ gains on post-tests are typically greater than for control groups exposed to individual 
training (e.g., Perret-Clermont, 1980) and this is true even for dyads whose explanations during 
collaboration are consistently incorrect (Azmitia, 1996). 
Other accounts propose in varied ways that explanation (including private “self-explanation” 
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activity, a core part of the young child’s attempts to make sense of the world.  For example, from a 
theory-theory perspective, children are forming naïve theories of the world and a key function of 
theories is to frame and promote causal-explanatory understanding (e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; 
2012). A special cognitive status for explanatory understanding is part of many other perspective  
within cognitive science, as reviewed by Lombrozo (2006).  
More generally, such data and varied theoretical claims have helped fuel increased research 
into the nature, role and development of children’s explanatory processes (e.g., Legare 2012; Legare 
et al., 2009, 2010; Keil, 2006; Frazier, Gelman & Wellman, 2009, 2016; Rhodes & Wellman, 2012; 
Walker et al., 2014; Wellman, 2011).  However, this burgeoning research has all been conducted 
with typically developing children, essentially those from advantaged backgrounds whose parents 
engage them in conversation, including frequent causal-explanatory exchanges. Better and broader 
understanding of children’s putative explanatory prowess would be achieved by examining children 
who may not have “normative” interactional familiarity with explanatory conversation, whose daily 
upbringing encompasses vastly reduced requests and opportunities for explanation. For ToM 
specifically, comparisons of children with differing daily levels of exposure to conversationally 
discussing and explaining mental states would be especially informative. 
Children born severely or profoundly deaf into hearing families are likely to be one such 
group. In the current research we focus on their explanatory competencies and, in particular, on 
whether an explanation advantage for ToM is present for them as for their hearing peers. In g neral, 
during early childhood, conversational access for many deaf children of hearing parents (DoH 
children) depends on their hearing family members’ levels of signing skills. Yet, with some notable 
exceptions, these are often poor so that DoH children gain only limited early exposure to family 
conversations, especially causal talk surrounding mental states (Kritzer, 2008). “Most hearing 
parents who do sign are limited to relatively concrete conversation with little or no capacity for 
extended discussions in sign of social phenomena, or intangibles like thoughts and feelings” (Vaccari 
& Marschark, 1997, p. 797). Yet, if at least one parent is a deaf native signer such mentalistic family 
conversation can proceed normally, though in sign rather than speech: that is, in a language that is 
fluently accessible to both conversational parties (Moeller & Schick, 2006).  
A review by Marschark et al. (2011) suggested that hearing adults more often take control of 
conversations when a child is deaf and, so as to avoid confusion, rarely mention their own doubts, 
mistakes, misunderstandings or faulty ideas. Similarly, for orally-communicating deaf children 
(including those with successful cochlear implants), easy access to spoken conversation is often not 
achieved for years after acquiring the implant (Schorr, Roth & Fox, 2008) and often remains a 
significant challenge especially when conversing with other children or in group situations (e.g., 
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implants in toddlerhood are unlikely to have had as much access as hearing preschoolers to the 
informal causal-explanatory conversations about peole that in hearing-only households are linked 
with early false belief success (e.g., Dunn, et al., 1991; Harris, 2006; Peterson & Slaughter, 2003).   
Thus studying these children’s ToM explanations and ToM predictions presents important 
opportunities for further insight into how these two processes develop and interconnect with one 
another. Possibly, DoH children may be poor at explanation in general, and at ToM explanation in 
particular, given their likely reduced conversational exposure to formal (e.g., with parents) and 
informal (e.g., with peers and siblings) causal explanatory talk, especially about unobservable mental 
states.  Thus, for them, the ToM explanation-prediction relation might be very different. In this vein, 
past studies have raised serious questions about deaf children’s causal-explanatory thinking and 
willingness to use question-answer conversations to gain explanatory information even outside the 
ToM domain. Pioneering studies asked DoH children to produce explanations for rules of school 
comportment (Rachford & Furth, 1986) or a novel game (Hoemann, 1972) and found substantially 
poorer performance than by younger hearing children. Further, Brice (1985) exposed 10-year-old 
DoH children to concrete demonstrations of puzzling phenomena and found they asked fewer why-
questions and were significantly more tolerant of cognitive ambiguity than hearing 6-year-olds. 
Unlike the latter they almost never offered their own explanations. Arnold, Palmer nd Lloyd (1999) 
used referential communication tes s and found that, compared to hearing peers, deaf 8-year-olds 
rarely or never requested necessary explanations or queried blatant ambiguities and omissions. More 
recently, Calderon and Greenberg (2003) likewise found that DoH children often misunderstoo  o  
ignored why-questions in conversation, thus concluding: “The impact of limited explanations and 
restricted experiences denies to many deaf children their rightful opportunity to learn to understand 
others” (p. 179). 
 Such findings suggest DoH children are relatively unfamiliar with the conversational 
exchange of “why” questions and answers, at least about ToM concepts. This could mean, according 
to interactional-familiarity accounts, that DoH children would not display an explanation advantage. 
Perhaps they might find both types of ToM test equally difficult. Still more likely, the simple 
pointing responses required by false belief prediction tasks could make them easier than false belief 
explanation tasks that require generating extended spontaneous conversational responses to “why” 
questions. Yet there are also reasons to predict that an explanation advantage similar to hearing 
preschoolers’ could arise for DoH children as well. As noted above, explanation may be especially 
fundamental to human reasoning. If so, this could be true for deaf and hearing children alike. 
Children ponder the causes of things in private reflection (explaining to oneself), not just ocialy 
through the conversation or more formal instruction. In contrast to the social exchange of well-
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(Keil, 2006) and hence potentially less dependent on conversational (or social-inter ctional) 
familiarity. Thus, complimenting theory-theory’s explanatory emphasis, Keil and Wilson (2000) 
summarized some of these arguments and data by saying that, “explanations seem to be a large and 
natural part of our cognitive lives” (p. 1).  
Beyond these arguments and evidence, which to reiterate, have exclusively considered 
hearing children and adults, there is tantalizing data from one prior study as to def children’s 
possibly accurate explanations for mental states. Peterson and Slaughter (2006) asked a group of 
late-signing DoH children (5 to 12 years) to tell stories (in sign) in response to socially- omplex, 
wordless pictures. Like hearing preschoolers, many deaf children who failed standard false belief 
prediction tasks not only described the pictured protagonists using simple cognitive words (e.g., 
“think”) but also offered causally coherent accounts of mental states in the form of “elaborations” 
(e.g., “Her brother is pretending that he is a ghost”) or even “explanations” (e.g., “She is cared 
because she thinks the ghost is real”). Since these DoH children mostly failed false belief (FB) 
prediction tasks these findings support the hypothesis (albeit indirectly) that DoH children could also 
evidence an explanation advantage similar to hearing preschoolers.  
The Current Research 
In two studies we compare FB explanation with FB prediction in DoH children. Since we are 
the first to do so, our study is novel and exploratory. Past evidence is too sparse and indirect to 
permit forecasting of precise directional hypotheses. Instead, any of the three possible outcomes 
(explanation advantage, prediction advantage or no difference between the two) allappe r plausible 
in advance of empirical evidence. Importantly whichever of the three possible outcomes emerges, it 
will not only be informative with regard to deaf children but will also have theoretical relevance for a 
broader understanding of how concepts about false beliefs and their causes develop in all children 
irrespective of hearing status.  
In this regard, it is important for theories of ToM to discover how explanations and 
predictions about people interconnect over development in children generally, not merely hearing 
ones. Further, owing to their slower ToM development than for hearing children or deaf native 
signers (Harris, 2006), studies of DoH groups can arguably supply unique insight into the 
developmental course of ToM-- in this case predictive and explanatory ToM competence. 
Comparisons between deaf and hearing groups can suggest testable hypotheses about the triggers for 
developmental change (e.g., early conversational experiences at home and at school) and are relevant 
to broad theories of the nature and development of ToM (e.g., experientially-dr ven conceptual 
change versus modular brain maturation: Slaughter & De Rosnay, 2017; Wellman, 2014). 
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Study 1 aimed to use well-matched standard tasks measuring FB prediction and explanation 
to test whether DoH children’s ToM reasoning is characterized by an explanation adva tage or, 
alternatively, whether they find explanation comparatively difficult. Possibly it might be as difficult 
as prediction, or even more so. Relatedly, we compare DoH children’s false-belief (FB) explanation 
and prediction skills with those of younger hearing preschoolers of matched (and imperfect) ToM 
understanding. Making such comparisons (between explanation and prediction and between hearing 
and DoH children) requires not only good tasks but also convincing ways to code children’s 
explanatory answers.  Hence we developed and used both a “standard” coding system (parallel to 
that used in prior research with typically-developing (TD) children) and a more stringently 
conservative coding system for explanations that required explicit mention of cognition and thus was 
designed to reveal a convincing depth of DoH (and hearing) children’s explanatory competence. 
Method 
Experimental Rationale 
 We compared deaf elementary school children (DoH) with TD hearing preschoolers. 
Although ages are different, these groups are well matched for our focal questions.  In order to see if 
X (explaining false-belief actions) precedes or is easier than Y (predicting false-beli f actions) we 
need to test children in both deaf and hearing groups who have not yet reached ceiling on X or Y. 
Children who always pass both sorts of tests, or always fail them both, provide little or no 
information for this comparison. This dictated our design. Past research shows that (a) hearing 
children have typically reached ceiling on false belief prediction by about age 5 (Wellman et al., 
2001) and (b) that many DoH children aged 6 to 11 years, while rarely at ceiling, will have at least 
begun to develop some skill at false belief prediction (see Peterson, 2009, for a review). 
Participants 
Seventy-five Australian children aged 3 to 12 years participated, in two groups. Group 1 had 
31 DoH children (mean age: 9.34 years; range: 5.83 to 12.42; 18 boys) from specialist bilingual 
hearing-impairment units using Auslan (Australian Sign Language) and spoken English as 
instruction media. Having grown up in hearing homes that, like most, are “neither fluent nor 
proficient” in sign (Goldin-Meadow & Mayberry, 2001, p. 224), these children were “late-signers” 
whose daily immersion in a natively-fluent signing community (of peers and teachers) had typically 
coincided with their entry into formal schooling between age 4 and 5. Nevertheless, by the time we 
tested them, all Group 1 children had signing skills that were, according to teachers, at least 
“adequate for everyday communication”. They had either severe (71+ dB) or profound (91+ dB) 
prelingual hearing losses and 17 (55%) had a cochlear implant. Precise information on age at 
implantation was unavailable to us. However, school records confirmed that all had received the 
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were bilingual in sign and speech to the extent that they (a) used both modalities to some degree on a 
daily basis and (b) all preferred bilingual testing to either sign or speech alone, as noted below.  
Group 2 had 44 TD hearing preschoolers (mean age: 4.13; range: 3.08-5.00; 25 boys). Gender 
balance did not differ between groups, Chi-square (1) < 1, N = 75, p = .914, but mean age did, t (73) 
= 17.33, p < .001, as a necessary consequence of our experimental design that, as noted above, 
required children who were unlikely to score at ceiling on at least one of the two sorts f tasks. No 
Group 2 child was bilingual, according to teachers. 
All in both groups had written parental informed consent and English as their family’s sole or 
primary language. While precluded by the terms of our institutional ethical approval fr m seeking 
details of parents’ incomes or educational attainments, teachers reported no serious economic 
hardship in this sample. All schools were government-fu ded (rather than private fee-paying) and 
drew from neighborhoods of predominantly middle socioeconomic (SES) status, each scoring above 
the 50th
Tasks and Scoring 
 percentile (in the advantaged direction) on the Australian government’s “socioeconomi  
indexes for areas” (SEIFA: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011), a composite reflecting the 
neighborhood’s median levels of parental education, income, rentals (versus home ownership), 
unemployment and proportion of unskilled occupations. 
False belief prediction (FBP): Three standard false belief prediction (FBP) tests were given. 
One was a misleading container task from Wellman and Liu (2004): After guessing the expected 
contents of a closed box (e.g., crayons or eggs), children were shown that it contained something 
unexpected (e.g., a toy car). A naïve boy doll then saw the closed box, followed by a test question 
“What does he think is in the box?” and a control “Did he see inside the box?” A pass required both 
correct. Two tasks were standard changed-location items from Baron-Cohen et al. (1985):  A girl put 
her ball inside a covered basket and departed.  A boy moved it to a box (Task 1) or the 
experimenter’s pocket (Task 2).  The girl returned and the test question “Where will she look for her 
ball?” was followed by two control questions, “Where is the ball now?” and “Where did the girl put 
the ball in the beginning?” All had to be correct to pass. Summed, the total false belief prediction 
(TFBP) score ranged from 0 to 3.  
False belief explanation (FBE). In a separate session, children received three false belief 
explanation (FBE) tasks. All were modeled closely on tasks used successfully in prior research with 
hearing preschoolers (e.g., Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Bartsch, Campbell & Troseth, 2007) and 
all were likewise similar to the prediction tests (described above) except for the nature of the test 
question. For the misleading container explanation task, after guessing the contents of a closed 
pictorially-labeled bandaid box, children saw it was empty whereas a plain blue box held bandaids. 
















This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved 
10 
labeled bandaid box. Children were asked “Why is she looking there?” along with a control questi n, 
“Where are the bandaids really?” The two changed-location explanation items involved pictorial 
stories about protagonists who became distracted (by a book, TV or phone) after seeing two items at 
specific locations on a table. The protagonist thus missed a crucial transposition of the items’ 
positions (which the child witnessed) and acted upon a false belief (e.g., drank from a flower vase 
rather than a glass). Children’s spontaneous signed or spoken replies to the ensuing test question 
(e.g., “Why is she drinking the flowers?”) were recorded in full.  If any child (rare in this sample) 
said “Don’t know” or nothing, there was one repeat (e.g., “She’s drinking the flower wat, hy?”) 
but no further prompts. Thus children’s own spontaneous explanations were elicited withoutany 
modeling or corrective feedback from the experimenter. 
Scoring of explanations. Table 1 shows a sampling of explanations taken from both groups’ 
transcripts. We coded these using two different scoring schemes. First, we applied a more lenient, 
“broadly epistemic” (BE) accuracy criterion that has been used effectively in many past studies of 
hearing preschoolers. Then to gain a more cautiously conservative picture of children’s explanatory 
capacities (especially the DoH children’s) we recoded their explanations with a novel “strictly 
cognitive” (SC) scheme. Both schemes are explained and illustrated in Table 1. Although our SC 
scheme was more stringent than previous studies’ through its requirement that cognition be 
mentioned explicitly, we reasoned that the most conservatively compelling v dence for ToM arises 
when explanations accurately infer and label protagonists’ mental states of ignorance or false belief 
using specifically cognitive verbs (“think”, “know” or synonyms: see Table 1). However, in oder
not to underestimate children or neglect other informative aspects of their reasoning, we separately 
applied the BE scoring of past research. Specifically, Amsterlaw and Wellman (2006) had included 
mistakes (unintentional action) along with cognition in their most sophisticated “Belief/Mistake” 
(p.154) category and Wimmer and Mayringer (1998) included “epistemic” references to perception. 
Thus, our lenient BE scoring allowed intention, perception and/or cognition terms to qualify for a 
pass, but not desire terms since Wimmer and Mayringe  (1998) argued these (e.g., “she wants a 
bandaid”) merely explain going somewhere but not going to the wrong location.  Similarly, 
following Amsterlaw and Wellman (2006), we did not count “situational” justificaons as correct 
(e.g., references to the current or past physical positions of objects) although Wimmer and Mayringer 
had done so.  Simply remembering that an object has moved does not guarantee that the child 
understands what is in the protagonist’s mind. Invalid reasons (e.g., “because she thinks flowers are 
yummy”) were also incorrect even if they included cognitive verbs. 
Using these criteria, children either passed (1) or failed (0) each FBE task with no extra credit 
given for using multiple correct terms. Total scores (summed over the three tasks) could range from 
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establish inter- ater reliability, a second coder (blind to children’s ages, hearing-status and the 
study’s hypotheses) used just the rules and examples in Table 1 to independently code a randomly-
chosen 86 responses representing both groups.  Agreement between coders was almost perfect, 98%. 
The few disagreements were resolved by discussion. 
 Language ability test.  To assess general lnguage skill we used the 22-item syntax 
(“Sentence Structure”) subscale of the CELF (Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals, 
Edition 1 (CELF/P): Wiig, Secord & Semmel, 1992). This test has been used effectiv ly in prior 
ToM research with typically developing children (e.g., Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002) and with 
deaf children in the same age range as the present sample (e.g., Paatsch & Toe, 2013; Pterson,
Wellman & Slaughter, 2012). It assesses a broad range of developmentally-sequenced lexical, 
morphological, and syntactic concepts via picture-pointing responses and is uniquely suitablefor 
validly assessing linguistic maturity among Auslan users (see Wellman & Peterson, 2013). Because 
no Auslan norms were available, we used raw total scores (out of the full 22 items) as the language 
measure for both groups (these are also better for comparing groups differing in age). All DoH 
children had complete language data. Six hearing preschoolers had missing data owing to school 
absence or other scheduling difficulties.  
Testing Procedure 
Children were tested individually at school by a male experimenter assisted, for all deaf 
children, by a professionally-qualified sign-language interpreter who translated the main 
experimenter’s speech into Auslan and the child’s Auslan into spoken words that the experimenter 
recorded. Interpreters were professionally accredited at the top interpreter level (Level 3) of Auslan 
signing skill by the peak national accreditation body in Australia, National Accreditation Authority 
for Translators and Interpreters (NAATI, 2011) and were already familiar to the deaf children from 
prior school interactions. The interpreter sat beside the main experimenter  (bo h facing the child), 
translating the experimenter’s speech into Auslan and repeating the child’s Auslan orally for the 
experimenter to record. This bilingual mode of task presentation, a familiar part of everyday school 
routines, was preferable to sign alone since--despite all being signers--many children in the sample 
also used some oral communication on a regular basis. Hearing preschoolers took the tasks 
individually in the oral mode only. Data collection for Study 1 took place between March 2009 and 
February 2014. 
Results 
Table 2 shows children’s scores on key measures. There was no significant difference 
between the groups in language skill, t (67) = 0.96, p = .340. That DoH children averaged roughly 
75% items correct (a clear pass) helps confirm reports by teachers that these DoH children had 
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belief prediction (TFBP). Only 16% of deaf children and 25% of hearing preschoolers (who were 
chosen to be younger than the normative false-belief mastery age: Wellman et al., 2001) passed 
TFBP by getting at least 2 of the 3 prediction items correct, a group difference that was not 
statistically significant, Chi square (1) < 1, N = 75, p = .356. Thus, as planned, there was room in 
each group for an explanation advantage to manifest itself. Prior to computing statistical analyses, we 
checked score distributions for normality. Shapiro-Wilk tests showed that TFBP, SC and BE scores 
were not normally distributed. Non-parametric tests were therefore employed for all analyses. To 
compare groups we used Mann-Whitney U tests. Monte Carlo confidence intervals (CI) around the p 
values are also reported. For total SC explanations both groups scored equivalently, Mann-Whitney 
U = 536.50, z = 1.67, p = .096, CI 95% [.091, .102]. However, 14 deaf children (45%) gave an SC 
explanation on at least 2 of 3 problems compared with only 23% of the TD group, a significant 
difference: Chi square (1) = 4.21, N = 75, p = .040. Similarly, DoH children outperformed hearing 
preschoolers on total broadly epistemic (BE) explanations, Mann-Whitney U = 453.50, z = 2.57, p = 
.010, CI 95% [.007, .011] and 23 deaf children (74%) but only 21 TD preschoolers (48%) gave a BE 
response to at least 2 of the 3 explanation problems, Chi square (1) =5.25, N =75, p = .022. At the 
same time, a large majority of deaf (87%) and of hearing (64%) children managed to explain at le st 
one false belief scenario using a correct BE reason, and this was a cognitive (SC) reason for 58% of 
the deaf and 43% of the hearing children. Thus both groups displayed skill with ToM explanation.  
Comparisons between school-aged deaf children and hearing preschoolers are, of course, 
only suggestive because, despite equivalent ToM prediction scores, the two groups differed in many 
age-related ways. Therefore we tested for any “explanation advantage” (explanation superior to 
prediction) by analyzing Groups 1 and 2 separately. First we compared total BE explanation scores 
with total prediction (TFBP) scores. For the DoH children the BE explanation total was significantly 
higher than TFBP total, Wilcoxon z = 4.21, p < .001, CI 95% [<.001, <.001] and the same was true 
for hearing preschoolers, Wilcoxon z = 2.99, p = .003, CI 95% [.001, .002]. Thus both groups 
demonstrated an explanation advantage in false belief understanding using this traditional BE scoring 
of past research. Next we made the same comparisons using our stricter cognitive (SC) scoring. For 
deaf children, the difference favoring SC explanation over prediction was significant, Wilcoxon z = 
2.74, p = .006, CI 95% [.004, .007]. But for hearing preschoolers, SC scoring yielded only a 
nonsignificant difference, Wilcoxon z < 1, p = .738. Spearman correlations revealed that language 
ability was significantly linked with all three ToM measures for deaf children, all rhos > or = .51, all 
ps < or = .003. For them, TFBP was also significantly correlated with age (p = .034). For the hearing 
preschoolers, SC and BE were significantly correlated with language ability: rho = .39, p = .017 and 
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Overall, a clear explanation advantage was demonstrated for signing deaf children aged 5 to 
12 years, including when using a narrowly conservative scoring scheme that demanded explicit 
causal mention of cognition. Hearing preschoolers replicated past studies (e.g., Amsterlaw & 
Wellman, 2006) in showing a clear explanation advantage when using traditional (BE) scoring that, 
like earlier studies’, credited accurate intention- a d perception-based explanations together with 
cognitive ones. But the advantage was not sta istically significant using the stricter SC scoring. These 
results reinforce the view that the process of explaining is fundamental to early cognitive 
development (Keil, 2006), especially in the naïve psychological domain (Wellman, 2011). More 
specifically, they not only continue to confirm that hearing preschoolers are better at explaining the 
consequences of others’ false beliefs than at predicting them, but also, for the first time, highlight 
how relatively proficient DoH children are at using ToM concepts to explain human behavior. For 
both deaf and hearing children alike, generating valid explanations for false-belief-driven behavior 
was significantly easier than making simple behavioral predictions about it and these school-age deaf 
children stood out also f r often including cognitive verbs like “think” in their explanations. 
Although differing baselines of chance success complicate precise comparisons between 
ToM explanations and predictions, we addressed this issue in two ways. First, we directly compared 
scores on closely-matched explanation and prediction tasks, regardless of baseline possibilities for 
spurious chance success. Ignoring chance baselines arguably works against finding better (or even 
equal) performance on ToM explanation because children could (and did) provide many possible 
kinds of explanations for the events presented in the stories, whereas the binary choice offered by a 
standard prediction task (e.g., predicting search of the basket versus the box) assures 50% odds of 
chance accuracy. This partly explains why the notion of an explanation advantage can initially seem 
counter-intuitive. Second, beyond the types of coding used in prior research, we assessed childr n’s 
explanations via our more stringent cognition-only scoring scheme.  Notably, DoH children’s 
explanations outstripped their predictions even using this stringently conservative scoring. 
It is worth considering whether (a) our prediction tasks might somehow have been spuriously 
difficult or (b) our explanation tasks might not have required genuine ToM understanding. Both 
possibilities seem unlikely. Our explanation tasks were taken from past studies of hearing children 
and were carefully modeled on standard changed-location and misleading-container prediction tests.  
Stories and overall procedures for both types of task were essentially the same apart from the test 
question (e.g., “Why does she look here?” versus “Where will she look?”). Furthermore, when 
children supply SC explanations like “Because she thinks the bandaids are in the box with the 
bandaids picture” it is hard to argue that they fail to understand false belief. 
By the same token, our prediction tasks were exactly those used in prior research with deaf 
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scored similarly to their counterparts in past studies (e.g., ours were 23% correct as against 17% for 
Italian DoH children in Meristo et al. (2007) and 32% (at mean age 7) for Schick et al.’s (2007) U.S. 
sample). Thus it is hard to argue that our ToM prediction measures were somehow unusually or 
spuriously difficult compared to past research.  
In this way, our deaf sample’s poor FB prediction performance was no surprise. What was 
notable was how comparatively well these same children did on FB explanation. This is a novel and 
important finding. Of course it is also important not to overstate DoH children’s competence at ToM 
explanation, or relatedly at ToM understanding. Even using the more lenient BE scoring of past 
research only 52% scored perfectly. More focally, even when deaf children gave sensible FB 
explanations, these did not translate into equally correct FB predictions. Though averaging five years 
older, the DoH children performed slightly worse than the TD preschoolers (mean TFBP = .68 
versus .80) on the latter, although not significantly so. Conversely, even our youngest DoH children 
(aged 5 and 6 years) showed some explanatory competence (e.g., 67% of those aged 7.00 years and 
under gave at least one correct BE explanation). Nevertheless, further investigation of DoH 
children’s explanatory competence in future research is clearly desirable, including testing younger 
DoH children (provided they have sufficient language to comprehend the tasks).  
As noted earlier, the difference in chronological age between our deaf and hearing groups 
was inevitable, given our research design and questions (i.e., to avoid unif rm ceiling or floor effects 
in either group). Conceivably this age difference may have contributed to the deaf-hearing difference 
in frequency of SC explanations in some unknown way. This warrants exploration in future research. 
Meanwhile, however, it is important to note that our other (BE) scoring scheme is the one used by all 
past research on this topic and that using this standard scoring deaf and hearing children did not 
differ. Both groups displayed a clearcut, statistically significant FB explanation advantage using BE 
scoring. Furthermore the advantage was of equivalent magnitude in both groups despite their age 
difference. SC scores have the methodological strength of being cautiously conservative, but they are 
unique to our study. The evidence of the deaf children’s explanation advantage with this addiion l 
more stringent measure is important, but further research using SC scores with other deaf and 
hearing groups is obviously needed before definitive conclusions or wider implications can validly 
be drawn. 
Study 2 
A crucial theoretical question concerning explanation’s advantages over prediction for deaf 
and hearing children alike concerns whether and how explanation assists further learning. 
Conceptually, being required to explain a now-apparent but unexpected fact or occurrence often 
makes the limited nature of one’s understanding blatantly obvious (Keil, 2006). Empirically, 
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generating causal explanations may supply a mechanism for causal learning (Keil, 2006; Lombrozo, 
2006). When asked repeatedly to explain events, TD children’s learning often exceeds that of non-
intervention control groups. The quality of subsequent explanations, predictions, and/or information 
retention have all been seen to improve over time for both preschoolers (Amsterlaw & Wellman 
2006; Frazier, Gelman & Wellman, 2016) and school-age children (Chi, DeLeeuw, Chiu, & 
LaVancher, 1994). These effects do not require any feedback as to the adequacy of one’s 
explanation; explanatory effort is sufficient.  
But of course, things could be different for deaf children. If so (or if not) this would be 
theoretically interesting. Returning to the theoretical alternatives outlined in our introduction, but 
now focusing specifically on learning, it is interesting to speculate on possible mechanisms that 
could contribute, within the ToM domain, both to children’s learning how to explain, and to their 
learning from explaining. Perhaps explanatory attempts operate at a fundamental level to facilitate 
conceptual development. They might, as Keil argued, work by emphasizing one’s unexpected 
ignorance. Equally, or alternatively, because explanations for misguided actions are i iti lly more 
sophisticated than corresponding predictions (as demonstrated for both deaf and hearing children in 
Study 1) the act of explaining may well motivate children to muster their most advance  ToM 
reasoning. This could conceivably provide a helpful platform for further insightful learning, 
ultimately assisting prediction as well. Indeed, for hearing children, being asked for ToM 
explanations in extended microgenetic sessions has been shown to boost subsequent performanc  on 
false belief prediction tests (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Rhodes & Wellman, 2013). 
An initial study, such as ours, cannot directly or deeply adjudicate between such theoretical 
alternatives. But it could take a needed step by establishing whether or not DoH children improve 
after being required to engage in explanatory effort in the context of ToM problems. Because deaf 
children are arguably exposed less often to explanatory conversational exchanges in general (see e.g., 
Wood & Wood, 1997 and Marschark at al., 2011 as outlined in the introduction) then if DoH 
children’s conceptual gains from being asked to explain people’s puzzling actions turn out to 
resemble hearing children’s, this could prove suggestive. So too would the alternative possibility –
namely that extended practice in generating explanations fails to benefit ToM understa ing for DoH 
children, contrary to some past evidence for hearing children. If such practice leads to subsequent 
gains for the deaf, this could generate further hypotheses. For example, the impact of explanation 
may operate via more fundamental cognitive mechanisms such as a universal human drive for ever 
greater understanding (Keil, 2006). To examine this, we designed an intervention study exposing 
DoH children intensively to the challenge of explaining acts of paradoxical ToM-driven behavior. 
One prior study in particular sets the stage for our research. Using a microgenetic training 
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explanations for a protagonist’s false-b lief-based behavior over multiple tasks spread over six 
weeks.  Half the problems involved unseen displacements and half, misleading containers.  On every 
trial a full false belief prediction test was initially given in standard format with a prediction test 
question (Where will Sally look for her ball?). Then the test story continued with the protagonist 
acting on the basis of a false belief, providing implicit feedback about whether the child’s prediction 
was correct. A FB explanation test question followed (e.g., “Why is she looking in the drawer?”). If 
no explanation was spontaneously forthcoming, the protagonist’s cognition was queried (e.g., “What 
does Marcia think?”). The 12 children in the focal microgenetic training group, who explained 12 or 
24 problems in their multiple sessions over 6 weeks, evidenced significant improvements on standard 
false belief (FB) prediction tests at posttest relative not only to pretest and but also towo control 
groups, one with microgenetic sessions of false belief prediction and another with no intervention. 
As well as improving on FB prediction, the focal training group displayed generalization to another 
type of ToM task (knowledge access), although not to an appearance-reality test assessing awareness 
that an object can look like one thing (e.g., an apple) but really be something else (e.g., a candle). 
These findings (also see Rhodes & Wellman, 2013) provide evidence that giving hearing 
preschoolers extended practice with explaining and predicting can result in higher scores on standard 
FB prediction tests post-tests. 
We followed a modified version of this template in Study 2 to explore FB explanation 
training in a sample of 25 school-aged DoH children. Our main change was to omit the FB prediction 
training that each of these past studies had included along with FB explanation practice on every 
training trial. Thus, as well as focusing on deaf children, our training procedure was novel in testing 
whether FB explanation practice can be given alone, versus whether it must be combined with FB 
prediction practice, in order to result in post-test gains. This in itself was an important 
methodological refinement that could help to narrow down the focal conditions responsible for past 
effects of FB explanation training. We also had a non-ToM control group. It was an “active non-
intervention” or “placebo” control (Boot, Simons, Stothart & Stutts, 2013) that, similar to the 
training group, engaged in teresting individualized activities with an experimenter and an Auslan 
interpreter, albeit with no ToM content. This type of control has the advantage over a pure non-
intervention control (where nothing except time intervenes between pretests and post-tests) of ruling 
out the hypothesis that merely growing older and/or participating in interesting activities could fully 
explain any post-test gains made by the focal training group.   
We predicted that children in our focal ToM-Training group (who were exposed, like Rhodes 
and Wellman’s (2012) and Amsterlaw and Wellman’s (2006) hearing children to 12 micro-genetic 
sessions with a story protagonist acting out FB-driven behaviors followed by requests to explain her 
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they would outperform the appropriately matched children in the non-ToM control group who, we 
predicted, would make little or no ToM progress.   
Method 
Experimental Design 
The procedure involved four phases: a pretest, an intervention, an immediate posttest and a 
delayed posttest. At pretest children received a battery of four standard false belief prediction tests.  
Eligible children were then selected as those who consistently failed these at pretest. We defined this 
stringently via the requirement that the child must have failed at least 75% (3 of 4) of pretest false-
belief-prediction items.  This ensured that all children (both intervention and controls) had room to 
improve prior to the intervention.  
For the intervention phase, the ToM-training group was given explanation practice with 12 
FB explanation scenarios (modeled closely on Amsterlaw and Wellman’s 2006 study: see Table 3), 
presented in 3 blocks of 4 problems per session. Each session was separated from the next by 2 to 4 
days. Thus training extended over a 3-week period, followed by the immediate post-test and, roughly 
12 weeks later, a delayed post-test to address whether ToM gains, if any, persisted over time. 
 The control group took the same pre- and post-tests as the ToM-training group and the gap 
between these was the same (s e details below). Rather than ToM explanation, however, they 
engaged in a 45-minute artistic (visual representation) problem-solving activity that had no ToM 
content. It was closely modeled on the procedures of Wellman and Peterson (2013).  
Participants 
The full sample of 25 DoH children in Study 2 (17 boys) had a mean age of 8.96 years 
(range: 6.25 to 13.08). None had taken part in Study 1. Just as in Study 1, children were preselected 
as having prelingual hearing losses that were either severe (85 to 90dB) or profound (91dB or 
greater) and were recruited from two specialist units for hearing impairment located within 
government-funded primary schools where a bilingual (sign-plus-speech) mode of communication 
was employed.  All the children had hearing parents, and, despite access to early intervention and 
efforts by some parents to learn some signs, their teachers reported that no child in this sample had 
any family member at home who used any form of signing as fluently as a native speaker. Furth  
eligibility requirements included: (a) freedom from disabilities apart from hearing loss, (b) English as 
parents’ sole or primary language, (c) written parental informed consent, and (d) at least one full 
year’s attendance at the bilingual school coupled with Auslan skills rated at least “adequate for 
everyday communication” by teachers.  
We allocated children into two groups--11 to the focal ToM Training group and 14 to the 
non-ToM Control group--on a semi-random basis with the constraints that (a) the two participating 
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were distributed across groups as equally as possible.  Subsequent statistical comparisons confirmed 
that these precautions were successful and that groups were well-matched in several respects: There 
were no group differences for (a) school attended, Chi-square (1) < 1.00, N = 25, p = .622, (b) mean 
age (M = 9.75 and 8.34 years respectively), t (23) = 1.96, p = .062, (c) gender balance, Chi-square 
(1) < 1.00, N = 25, p = .653, (d) proportions with cochlear implant(s) (54% and 29%), Chi-square (1) 
= 1.73, N = 25, p = .188, or (e) mean language ability, t (23) < 1.00, p = .887. 
General Procedures 
Each child in the ToM training group was individually tested on all tasks in a bilingual 
modality (sign + speech: see Study 1) in a quiet school area.  For the control group’s pretests and 
post-tests the same was true. But their “placebo” intervention involved not only periods of individual 
(bilingual) interaction (with the same experimenter and interpreter as for the training group), but also 
periods of working alongside 1 to 4 other children in a small group on an art activity. For all
children, task presentation and interpretation procedures were exactly as in Study 1, with the 
interpreter translating experimenter’s speech into Auslan for the child, and vice versa. All 
interpreters were fully professionally accredited Auslan interpreters (NAATI, 2013). Data collection 
for Study 2 took place between March 2014 and October 2014. 
ToM pretests.  Before their intervention began, all children in both groups were individually 
pretested on a battery of standard FB prediction tasks, two involving changed locations (both trials of 
Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1985) Sally-Ann task) and two involving misleading containers (a toy car in a 
crayon box and a candy box containing pencils). Procedures, questions and scoring matched Study 
1’s, including the requirement for perfect accuracy on a task’s control as well as test questions for a 
pass. 
Language ability pretest. The Sentence Structure (Syntax) subscale of the Clinical 
Evaluation of Language Fundamentals (CELF-P) test (Wiig, Secord & Semmel 1992) was presented 
and scored just as described for Study 1. 
Intervention Phase and Procedures 
ToM intervention. The ToM-explanation intervention was modeled closely on Amsterlaw 
and Wellman (2006) with one major modification.  Rather than including any FB prediction 
questions or corrective feedback, our training omitted both of these. Each training task began with a 
protagonist acting on the basis of a false belief (see Table 3) followed by the FB explanation 
question (“Why…?). Our rationale for excluding Amsterlaw and Wellman’s (2006) use of a 
prediction test question on each trial prior to the focal explanation test question was twofold.  First, 
the language for asking FB prediction questions (e.g., “What does James think is in the lunchbox?”) 
could cue children to use verbs like “think” in their explanations. Second, with Amsterlaw and 
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questions during training could add to (or even substitute for) any benefit directly attribut ble to the 
act of explaining. Thus (as noted above) our training more conservatively tested possible benefits
from FB explanation practice alone, without concomitant FB prediction practice. Half our training 
tasks (see Table 3) involved changed locations and half misleading containers. Within each half, 
dolls and props were used half the time and picture-book stories about real children for th  other half. 
No differences were observed as a function of these variations in task format. Our sample, like 
Amsterlaw and Wellman’s focal group, received a total of 12 false belief explanation problems. For 
us, these were presented individually in 3 separate sessions of 4 problems each.  Sessions were 
spaced 3 to 7 days apart across a total span of roughly 3 weeks. 
As Table 3 shows, the ToM-training group’s scenarios closely resembled standard FB 
prediction tasks in all respects except the wording of the test question (e.g., “Why will she look” 
rather than “Where will she look”). Children’s answers to test questions were recorded verbatim in 
full . If a control question (e.g., “Where are the bandaids really?”) was answered incorrectly (rare in 
this sample), the story and questions were repeated once.  No more than one repetition was ever 
necessary.  Finally, if the child’s explanation did not include a cognitive term, the supplementary 
question “What is he [she] thinking?” was asked, just as in Amsterlaw and Wellman (2006). The 
next task began immediately so that no corrective feedback or any other implicit or explicit 
instruction was ever given. Thus, strictly speaking, children were not “trained” either about FBs or 
about how best to explain them. Nor were they informed as to the accuracy of their own spontaneous 
explanations. Instead, they were merely given extended practice with “why” questions that 
encouraged them to consider the causal basis for protagonists’ unexpected reality-iscrepant 
behaviors, together with the subtle suggestion to consider the protagonist’s mental state (“What does 
she think?”) if they failed to spontaneously mention cognition in their explanation. 
Control intervention. The control group’s intervention occupied the same interval from pre-
to post-tests as the ToM-training group’s (means = 26.17 and 25.45 days, respectively: t < 1, p = 
.711). As noted earlier, it consisted of a visual-representation exercise offering general practice in 
following task instructions, deploying attention between teacher and interpreter and dealing with 
representational materials, albeit in a manner that was visual and pictorial rather than mentalistic. 
Briefly, a visual stimulus (e.g., a photo of elephants, a vase of real flowers, etc.) was shown and, as 
in ToM training, a short introductory narrative framed the exercise (e.g., “Look at this photo: What 
are these?  Yes, elephants. Look: there is a big one, a small one and [point] what size is this?  Yes, 
middle-sized. Now here’s your paper. You draw three elephants. Do them so they fill the whole 
page. Use lots of color. Try to do yours just like the picture. Make one big, one small and one 
middle-sized”). After children began to work, the experimenter and interpreter visited each child 
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included specific suggestions and general encouragement while taking care never to mention
thoughts, intentions, beliefs or other mental states. 
Post-Test Procedures and Scoring 
Immediate post-tests. The immediate posttest had four standard FB prediction tests (two 
involving changed-locations and two involving misleading containers). These mirrored those used at 
pretest with different scenarios, pictures and props. In addition there were two appearance-reality FB 
prediction tests (Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003). There was also a knowledge-acc ss (KA) task at 
immediate and delayed post-test (see Peterson, Wellman & Liu’s (2005) Appendix for exact 
wording) to assess generalization to a novel (untrained) ToM concept other than FB. All 11 children 
in the ToM-training group took the immediate posttest but two in the control group missed it owing 
to protracted school absence. (Both were available for the delayed posttest and so were retained for 
all analyses not involving the immediate posttest). 
Delayed post-test. For the delayed posttest (assessing retention over 3 months) we used new 
dolls and materials for the four core false belief prediction items (i.e., two new Sally-Ann-type tasks 
and two misleading container tasks) plus knowledge-access. 
Total post-test scores.  The core measure of false-b lief-prediction skill for each of the 
testing phases (pretest, immediate posttest and delayed posttest) was a four-item total false belief 
prediction (TFBP4) composite summing scores on the two misleading container and the two
changed-location items. At immediate post-test there was a six- tem TFBP6 score summing TFBP4 
with the two appearance-reality FB tasks requiring prediction of a naïve other’s belief about the true 
identity of a deceptive item. The single knowledge access (KA) generalization item was scored pass 
(1) or fail (0).  
Results and Discussion 
 Results are considered first in terms of changes in children’s performance on standard FB 
prediction tests as a result of our focal ToM training (involving explanation but not prediction). Next 
we examine possible differences between children in the training group versus the control group on 
the immediate and delayed posttests. Finally we explore the specific explanations generated by 
children in the training roup during their training sessions and whether se relate to increases on 
their post-test FB prediction scores relative to pretest. 
Changes in False Belief Prediction Skills from Pretest to Post-tests.  
Figure 1 shows the primary measure, mean total false belief prediction (TFBP4) scores at 
pretest, immediate post-test and delayed post-test. As the figure illustrates, children in the ToM- 
training group gained significantly from the pretest to the immediate posttest in scores on standard 
misleading container and changed location false belief prediction tasks. As in Study 1, nonparametric 
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Monte Carlo confidence intervals around the p values for significant effects. For the ToM-training 
group, there was a significant gain from the pretest to the immediate posttest in TFBP4 scores (see 
Figure 1 and Table 4), Wilcoxon z = 2.63, p = .007, CI 95% [.006, .009]. Furthermore, at delayed 
post-test, their TFBP4 scores were also significantly higher than at pretest, Wilcoxon z = 2.72, p = 
.006, CI 95% [.004, .007] indicating maintenance of their significant gains 12 weeks later. By 
contrast, the non-ToM control group did not improve significantly on TFBP4 from pretest to either 
the immediate post-test, Wilcoxon z = .45, p = .655, or the delayed post-test, Wilcoxon z = 1.55, p = 
.121.   
Post-test Comparisons between Training and Control Groups 
As Figure 1 illustrates, both groups scored equally on TFBP4 at pretest (p = .572) but there 
were significant group differences on TFBP at the immediate post-test, Mann-Whitney U = 22.50, z
= 2.78, p = .004, CI 95% [.003, .005] and at the delayed post-test, Mann-Whitney U = 33.50, z = 
2.49, p = .013, CI 95% [.011, .015]. The ToM-training group significantly outperformed the control 
group at both times. On the single KA item testing for generalization to a ToM concept not used in 
training there were no statistically significant group differences at immediate post-test or delayed 
post-test (see Table 4 for means). However, there was a trend for those in the ToM-training group to 
outperform the control group at immediate post-te t, Chi square (1) = 3.49, N = 23, p = .062. 
Explanations during training   
Notably, each child in the ToM-training group gave a coherent explanation for each of the 12 
training problems (there were no "don’t knows"). This indicated consistent interest and involvement 
with the task and highlighted Study 1’s findings that a drive to explain paradoxical human action is 
clearly evident in DoH children. Their consistent responsiveness indicated, furthermore, that all 
children could account plausibly (to their own satisfaction if not to ours) for the mistaken behavior in 
each of the training stories. We used the same strict scoring scheme as in Study 1 to tally both BE 
(broadly epistemic) and SC (strictly cognitive) explanations. As in Study 1, SC explanations had to 
explicitly mention a cognitive verb (e.g., “think”) in an appropriate (causally antecedent) context. 
Similarly, BE explanations had to appropriately invoke an epistemic state of perception, intention or 
cognition (Tables 1 and 3 give examples). Desire (e.g., “want”) explanations, while common, were 
not credited for reasons detailed in Study 1. The same was true of situational explanations (devoid of 
mental state terms) and non-causal mentions of an appropriate verb. Explanation performance of the 
training group during training partially replicated Study 1. On the first 4 training trials correct BE 
explanations (normally distributed) were significantly more frequent than correct FB predictions on 
the first 4 pretest items, t (10) = 2.80, p = .019. Moreover, 9 of the 11 ToM training-group children 
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explanations. Correct SC explanations were used by 6 of the 11 children (55%) at least once during 
training.  
There were also wide individual differences within the ToM-training group in children’s 
frequencies of using BE and SC explanations. To see if these were connected with training’s 
effectiveness, we computed correlations with post-te  FB prediction scores. (We used nonparametric 
Spearman correlations for these analyses owing to the non-normality of TFBP score distributions). 
Children’s total SC explanations during training correlated significantly with their TFBP prediction 
scores on both the immediate post-test, rho = .62, p = .041 and the delayed post-test, rho = .77, p = 
.006. But there was no correlation of training SC scores with pretest TFBP, implicating explanation 
performance during the training phase, rather than pre-existing false-belief prediction skill, in the 
post-test associations. Correlations for BE explanations during training trended in a similar direction, 
but were non-significant (all rhos < or = .55, all ps > or = .079) possibly due to the small sample size 
and the fact that all but two children gave at least one BE explanation during training, resulting in 
little individual variability. 
Study 2 Conclusions 
After repeated practice devising their own explanations for story protagonists’ reality-
discrepant actions during training, the children in our ToM-training group showed significant gains 
in false belief prediction relative to pretest and these were still apparent 3 months later. By contrast, 
the control group made little or no ToM progress, ruling out general factors like passage of tim r
opportunities for special activities as the factors accounting for progress by the focal group. Our 
study is an advance in this regard over some prior ToM-training studies of hearing preschool rs that 
have often overlooked the need for any sort of active non-ToM control or indeed (sometimes) for any 
control condition at all. Without this, simply observing progress in the intervention group does not 
validly permit the conclusion that the intervention itself made any difference. 
 Arguably, our focus on DoH children for this demonstration is advantageous. It shows that 
experiences with ToM explanation can result in post-test gains even for a group whose ToM 
development would, without intervention, proceed slowly over a very prolonged time period. This 
unusually protracted timetable for spontaneous ToM mastery by DoH children is instructive. In 
contrast to TD children, who ordinarily master false belief so rapidly that spontaneous gains might   
arise without intervention between pretest and delayed post-test, this was much less likely for our 
DoH children (Peterson & Wellman, in press). Also, unlike some past studies of hearing 
preschoolers (e.g., Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006) our focal training intervention did not include 
either practice with FB prediction or feedback on explanation or prediction accuracy. Nor did it 
include any exposure to the well-crafted model explanations created by adults that have been used in 
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2014). Instead, in our study, DoH children were simply faced with the challenge of explaining story 
protagonists’ unexpected reality-discrepant actions. All in our sample rose to the challenge and 
managed to devise their own accounts of why the s ory protagonists were behaving so oddly, even if 
these were not always adequate by adult standards. That is, after being asked to explain, and finding 
a way to do so, even children whose explanations did not explicitly refer to epistemic mental states 
displayed improvement on FB prediction post-tests. Our study has the limitation, however, of only 
having a single control group. Thus while supportive of the inference that something about the ToM 
intervention we used was more beneficial than a matched control intervention devoid of ToM 
content, we cannot identify with certainty what this “something” was.  
Our preferred hypothesis i that the key ingredient isDoH children’s greatly enhanced 
practice with ToM explanation during our intervention. Yet because of the limitations of our control 
group, it is admittedly unclear whether improvement resulted from engaging in explanation or 
merely from being exposed to ToM materials and questions. Training research with typically 
developing children has shown that, for them, mere exposure to ToM materials is insufficient to 
produce training improvement (e.g., Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Lohmann & Tomasello, 2003) 
suggesting the same could be true for deaf children, especially given their pre-xisting ToM delays. 
However this is an empirical question that needs to be examined in future res arch. In particular, 
future research could examine this issue directly by including an additional control group that would 
be exposed to the same ToM stimulus materials but without any requests to generate explanations.  
In broad terms, our findings have the general theoretical implications outlined at the start and 
supported by findings of Study 1. Because our participants were DoH children who arguably 
experience a paucity of explanation requests (especially ToM-relevant ones) in their homes and 
classrooms, and are known to be reluctant to ask why, our data argue against the hypothesis that 
training such as ours can only assist children with long and varied practice in seeking and receiving 
mental-state explanations during social interaction and conversation in everyday life from 
toddlerhood (Keil, 2006) onwards. Instead our findings appear more consistent with the view that 
general cognitive processes recruited by explanation attempts may underpin the gains observed. Of 
course, further evaluation and support for such hypotheses depends on additional research, including
future studies using multiple control groups.  
General Discussion 
Results of both studies highlight the importance of FB explanation in relation to two broad 
interpretations outlined in our introduction. Study 1’s demonstration of an FB explanation advantage 
over FB prediction for DoH children, just as for the hearing, is in line with suggestions that the drive 
to understand and explain represents a fundamental outcome of, and contributor to, cognitive 
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2006; Lombrozo, 2006; Wellman, 2011). As Keil (2006) noted, “Explanations in their own right can 
be immensely rewarding things and may be sought out as such, even by the youngest of children” (p. 
234). Perhaps this helps to explain superiority of deaf and hearing children’s ToM explanations over 
their ToM predictions in Study 1, as well as the post-test ToM gains the DoH children displayed after 
completing our training intervention in Study 2.  
Of course, with only cross-sectional and training data to go on, current research (our own and 
that of other past studies) cannot not yet demonstrate that explanation is fundamental for children in 
the sense of being a naturally-occurring chronological precursor to prediction.  Future longitudinal 
studies would be useful to examine the spontaneous emergence of ToM-relevant explanations and 
predictions. Longitudinal research with DoH children would be an especially welcome addition to 
such a project.  Given DoH children’s presumed reduced exposure to the everyday conversatial 
exchange of “why” questions and explanations, our data suggest that the search to explain perplexing 
human behavior may be cognitively fundamental for all children in the sense of a readily available 
and important platform for learning. Explanations have the potential to scaffold ToM growth and, as 
we noted earlier, this possibility is supported by Study 2’s findings. Arguably the act of explaining 
coupled with an explanation advantage evokes some of a child’s most advanced cognitions (in line 
with results of Study 1). Relatedly, Legare, Wellman and Gelman (2009) demonstrated an 
explanation advantage (over prediction) for preschoolers’ naïve biological reasoning about 
contamination and infection. This too suggests that explanatory reasoning is arguably a cognitive 
fundamental. That deaf children in particular, along with hearing children, become so easily engaged 
with the task of explanation accords with Keil’s (2006) view that, “all of us throughout the world 
share the same drive for explanation” (p. 44).   
If so, what sort of mechanisms might account not just for children’s interest in explanations 
but their relative competence with explanation relative to prediction? Wellman and Liu (e.g. 2007) 
have argued that much everyday explanation may be cognitively easier than prediction.  Prediction 
often entails open-ended uncertainty among a great many potential outcomes. Even in cut-and-dried 
location-change false-belief tasks, the protagonist might search for his desired candy in location A, 
or B, or perhaps nowhere (e.g., if he is no longer hungry or assumes someone else has already eaten 
it) or even in both places at once (because he thinks equally desirable identical candies are actually in 
both locations), and so on.  But often explaining merely requires post-diction of known outcomes 
that can be accounted for after the fact.  The protagonist is in fact searching for his candy in location 
X. That is a given. So all the child has to do is come up with a reason why. Hence explanation very 
often (though not always) requires post-diction. Not just in children’s thinking but also in scientific 
theorizing, predicting future outcomes in situations of uncertainty is often deemed to be a
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Explanation’s advantage for FB learning could additionally involve the mechanism described 
earlier: Explanations evoke some of a child’s most advanced cognitions and this in turn could 
scaffold ToM growth by making such reasoning more practiced and consciously available. Possibly, 
many factors are at play in past demonstrations of any explanation advantage for ToM tasks. For one 
thing, adult-child conversations could drive early propensities for explanatory sense-making. When 
children ask and answer “why” questions their everyday cognition is often directed at understanding 
recent events, especially those involving human acts and motives. Also, the ease of post-diction 
might contribute to early, formative explanatory successes. Thus satisfaction at having resolved an 
explanatory puzzle could motivate further efforts and successes and these could ultimately benefit 
prediction as well.  
Besides their theoretical value, data from both studies suggest there could be practical value 
to be gained from eliciting and encouraging explanations from DoH children. In particular, our 
findings suggest this could benefit ToM development specifically, although in theory, this could also 
apply more broadly to other domains of knowledge. Of course, with only 11 DoH children in Study 
2’s ToM-training group, and only a single control group, our results are clearly tentative and require 
replication and extension before such practical applications are attempted. Further research both in 
the ToM domain and more broadly could address this. Meanwhile our data demonstrate the 
promising potential of an intervention as simple as being asked “Why?” as a possible stimulus to 
cognitive growth.  
Indeed, could greater use of “why” questions in classrooms benefit deaf children’s education? 
Our Study 2 data do not directly address educational benefits of explanatory efforts for DoH 
children. Yet they do enhance the plausibility of testable hypotheses such as that the successful 
sharing of “why” questions and explanations through conversation (especially with fluently signing 
peers or teachers) could be particularly helpful for these children. This is further suggested indirectly 
by evidence of DoH children’s superior performance on cognitive tasks (Piagetian conservation and 
justice reasoning) after having explained their views to signing deaf peers in socio-cognitive conflict 
paradigms (e.g., Peterson & Peterson, 1990). Children who debated with a signing deaf partner and 
attempted to explain their conflicting views made significant gains on individual conservation post-
tests irrespective of whether or not the dyad had achieved a correct solution while interacting. Thus, 
hypothetically, training interventions incorporating explanation could conceivably prove helpful for 
boosting deaf children’s understanding not just of ToM but also in many other cognitive domains. 
 Other aspects of our findings also warrant continued research. For example, it would be 
useful to investigate explanatory ToM reasoning in still younger DoH children. Admitte ly this 
would be difficult because their delayed language competence means younger DoH children would 
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verbal explanations that our sample produced. Unlike FB prediction, FB explanation questions 
cannot adequately be answered via simple monosyllables or finger-pointing. However, it remains 
possible that merely being asked “why” questions can engage young (and deaf) children’s drive for 
explanation even in the absence of the overt production of a satisfactory explanation (e.g., Azmitia, 
1996; Peterson & Peterson, 1990) or perhaps any explanation at all. Relatedly, tasks where childr n 
can reveal their explanatory curiosity via exploratory manipulation of objects (e.g. Legare, Zhu & 
Wellman, 2013; Walker et al., 2014) could be feasible for this group.  
Whether the explanation advantage is especially pronounced for deaf and/or hearing children
when explaining intentional human actions is intriguing. Explanations appear very early and bro dly 
for typically developing children (e.g., Keil, 2006) and human behavior has been found to be a 
particularly compelling magnet for young children’s interest and explanatory prowess (e.g., Callanan 
& Oates, 1992; Hickling & Wellman, 2001). Deaf children too might be more motivated to try to 
explain socially relevant acts than purely academic material. However, without direct evidence from 
DoH children, this is only one of several possibilities that further research could helpfully address.  
Naturalistic studies of DoH children’s spontaneous conversations with hearing-speaking family 
members and signing peers could also prove revealing. It would be interesting to actually know how 
often “why” questions and answers, especially bout people’s mental states, are spontaneously 
exchanged and with whom. Further, even if causal-exp anatory discourse turns out to be infrequent, 
DoH children might engage in it sometimes and in revealing ways.  A possible first step would be to 
have caregivers compile diary records of deaf children’s spontaneous “why” questions and answers, 
as in Callanan and Oakes’ (1992) study of hearing children. 
Meanwhile, the current studies make several important contributions. First, they contribute to 
burgeoning literature suggesting that the simple act of explaining can promote cognitive 
development in children generally. Lombrozo’s (2006) proposal that “Explaining novel information 
to oneself can facilitate learning…and foster generalization” (p. 471) aligns with our Study 2 finding 
that our focal explanation intervention resulted in superior post-test performance over pretest. This 
arose not only on FB prediction tasks that used scenarios similar to training but also on completely 
new types of post-test FB prediction problems. Furthermore, the specific explanations that the 
children in the training group generated, while satisfying to themselves, did not alwaysmeet adult 
standards for a convincing ToM-based argument.  
The exact mechanisms responsible are uncertain and clearly require further study. 
Nonetheless, our findings reinforce the value of pursuing explanation research as an avenue towards 
greater scientific understanding of the development of ToM and cognition generally. They also 
initiate new methods and new populations for the pursuit of these research directions. Th rd, our 
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delay. Fourth, they highlight the need for further investigation of a novel and straightforward 
intervention (asking why) that merits applied evaluation in practical settings a  a possible means to 
assist not only DoH children’s overcoming of ToM delays but also the formal and informal 
education of children generally. 
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Cognitive verb(s) used 
to relevantly and 
causally explain the 
false-belief-based action 
“She assumed it had bandaids 
because of the picture” “She 
thought it was her drink”; “She 
forgot where she put her cup; 
“She did not realize it was the 
flowers”, “She was not thinking 
and grabbed the closest one”;  
 




Perception or intention 
term(s) used to plausibly 
and relevantly explain 
the target action 
“She saw her glass there before”; 
“She sees the bandaid picture”; 
“She reads the label”; “She’s on 
the phone with her eyes shut”; 
“She meant to take the other 
one”; “She grabbed the wrong 







Explanations that fail to 
clearly identify a 
necessary causal 
precondition for the 
mistaken action, 
including desire (D), 
situational (S), non-
causal (NC), irrelevant  
“She wants chocolate sauce” (D); 
“She’s thirsty” (D); “She needs a 
bandaid” (D); “Her glass was 
there before” (S); “Someone 
swapped the bottles” (S); “She 
opens the bandaids and sees it’s 
empty” (NC); “She’s a bad girl” 
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(I) and empty (E) 
explanations 
 




Table 2. Mean scores on key Study 1 variables for children in each group 
Variable Group 1: Deaf (n = 31) Group 2: Hearing (n = 44)











3.08 to 5.00 
Total false belief prediction 
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Table 3: Examples of Study 2 explanation training tasks with test questions and sample responses 
 
Explanation training tasks Test question Sample responses from transcripts 
1. A kitten chases ball of wool from under the bed to 
under a chest of drawers. A boy who saw the ball under 
the bed was out of the room when the kitten moved it 
(pictured, changed location) 
“Why is he looking under the bed?” “He thinks his cat is there” (C) 
 “He did not see the kitten hiding the ball” (BE) 
“He wants the ball” (W) 
“Because he can’t find his cat” (W) 
2. A gift is hidden under the big blue bed by A and, in 
A’s absence, it is moved by B who hides it under the 
small pink bed (props, changed location) 
“Why is A going to the big blue 
bed?” 
“He was not watching her when she put it there” (BE) 
“He wants to wrap the present” (W)  
3.  Boy pours a glass of desired drink (juice) and puts it 
just behind him on desk; Mum silently moves the juice 
far side of the table and puts an undesired drink (water) 
where the juice was (pictured, changed location) 
“Why is boy drinking the water?” “He doesn’t know Mum moved the water there” (C) 
“Because that’s not orange juice” (W) 
“Because Mum swapped the drinks around” (W) 
4. Puzzle pieces are moved from their commercial box 
(pictorially labeled) to a plain box. Then a naïve doll 
arrives with a partly assembled puzzle wanting a 
missing piece (props, misleading container) 
“Why does she look here [pointing at 
pictorially labeled] box for her 
dinosaur puzzle?” 
“She sees the dinosaur [label] so she thinks it’s in 
there” (C) 
“She does not know the puzzle is in the other box” (C) 
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5. Doll with a bleeding knee marches towards a 
pictorially labeled bandaid box. (Only the child knows 
it is empty and that bandaids are in blue box across the 
desk) (props, misleading container)  
“Why is she going to this box 
[pointing]”? 
“Cos it looks like bandaids should be in that kind of 
box” (BE) 
“She needs a bandaid” (W) 
“She is bleeding” (W) 
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Table 4.  Performance on Study 2 post-test measures and language ability 
 
 Group N Mean (SD) 
Immediate Post- est TFBP4 Training 11 2.27 (1.42) 
(max. 4) Control 12 .58 (.793) 
Immediate Post- est KA  Training 11 .64 (.50) 
(max. 1) Control 12 .25 (.45) 
Immediate Post- est TFBP6 Training 11 3.45 (1.92) 
(max. 6) Control 12 .92 (1.23) 
Delay Post-test TFBP4 Training 11 2.82 (1.47) 
(max. 4) Control 14 .83 (.84) 
Delay Post-test KA Training 11 .73 (.47) 
(max. 1) Control 14 .50 (.52) 
Language Ability  Training 11 14.82 (3.00) 
(max. 22) Control 14 15.00 (3.26) 
 
 
Figure 1. False belief prediction (percent correct) by ToM-Training and Non-ToM-Control groups at 
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